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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kenneth Jay Whitley timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation. On appeal, Mr. Whitley argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him
due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the appellate record with
various transcripts.

Additionally, Mr. Whitley argues that the district court abused its

discretion when it revoked his probation and when it denied his oral request for a
sentence reduction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Whitley and some of his friends decided to "jump" one of their high school
classmates.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.151.)

The boys

surrounded the victim at a park. According to the victim, Mr. Whitley started punching
the victim. (PSI, p.151.) According to other eye witnesses, Mr. Whitley was present but
did not punch the victim. (PIS, p.153.) The victim fell down and lost consciousness.
(PSI, p.151.) Eighty dollars was then stolen from the victim. (PSI, p.151.)
Mr. Whitley was charged, by information, with robbery and conspiracy to commit
robbery. (R., pp.26-28.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Whitley pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit robbery and, in return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charge.

(R., pp.32-33, 36, 46-47.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified

sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.46-48.)
Upon review of Mr. Whitley's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the
district court again suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Whitley on probation.
(R., pp.56-59.)

1

After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for a bench warrant for a
probation violation alleging that Mr. Whitley violated the terms of his probation.
(R., pp.64-66.) Mr. Whitley admitted to violating the terms of his probation by changing

his residence without permission, failing to complete an aftercare treatment program,
and failing to pay fines and fees.

(R., pp.64-66, 80.)

probation and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.82-83.)

The district court revoked

Upon review of Mr. Whitley's

second rider, the district court again suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Whitley on
probation. (R., pp.87-90.)
After a second period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation
and an amended motion for probation violation alleging that Mr. Whitley violated the
terms of his probation. (R., pp.104-106, 137-139.) Mr. Whitley admitted to violating the
terms of his probation by smoking marijuana, absconding supervision, and failing to pay
restitution.

(Tr., p.10, L.15 - p.11, L.9.)

At the final probation violation disposition

hearing, Mr. Whitley orally requested a sentence reduction. (Tr., p.23, Ls.5-10.) The
district court revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence without reduction.
(R., pp.148-149: Tr., p.31, Ls.17-24.) Mr. Whitley timely appealed. (R., pp.151-153.)

On appeal, Mr. Whitley filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-5.) The State objected to Mr. Whitley's request
for the transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing

Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to
Augment), pp.1-5.)

Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying

Mr. Whitley's request for the transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on
November 19, 2010, sentencing hearing held on January 7, 2011, rider review hearing
held on June 3, 2011, probation violation admission hearing held on January 20, 2012,
2

probation violation disposition hearing held on February 3, 2012, and the rider review
hearing held on July 13, 2012. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.)

3

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Whitley due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record on appeal with
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Whitley's
probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Whitley's oral request
for a sentence reduction?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. V\/hitley Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record On Appeal With Transcripts Necessary
For Review Of The Issues On Appeal

A

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a "colorable need"
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists.
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Whitley's request for
transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on January 7, 2011, the rider review hearing
held on June 3, 2011, the probation violation disposition hearing held on February 3,
2012, and the rider review hearing held on July 13, 2012. (Order Denying Motion to
Augment), p.1.)

On appeal, Mr. Whitley is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's

denial of his request for these transcripts.

Mr. Whitley asserts that the requested

transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion
when it failed to grant his oral request for a sentence reduction because the applicable
standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the
entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

5

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Whitley With Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits-Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art.
I§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, the
transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho
court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further,

"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
6

An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting substantial rights of the defendant."

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)
motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9).

See

State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for

reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.AR.
11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested
materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,

7

the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
a crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold
as follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due

process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.

8

At the same time, the

Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin
when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be
accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness
standard. "Under the present standard, .... [the appellants] must convince the trial
judge that their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript
necessary to prosecute their appeal."

Draper, 327 U.S. at 494.

The Court first

expanded upon its holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an
equivalent alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part
or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration
of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at
195.

This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts might be relevant to the
issues on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be
created at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested
transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Whitley's Appeal Because He Is
Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire
Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review.

"In

examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing .
10

" State v.

Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010); see also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App.
2009).
In this case, Judge Hansen presided over the final disposition hearing held on
August 16, 2013, where the district court made the sentencing related decisions that are
being challenged on appeal.

(R., p.147.)

Judge Hansen also presided over the

sentencing hearing held on January 7, 2011, the rider review hearing held on June 3,
2011, the probation violation disposition hearing held on February 3, 2012, and the rider
review hearing held on July 13, 2012.

(R., pp., 44, 53, 81, 86.)

At each of these

hearings, Mr. Whitley addressed the district court. (R., pp.45, 54, 81, 86.) The following
authority establishes that the transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an
appellate court to review the merits of Mr. Whitley appellate sentencing claims.
The Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in State v. Brunet, _

Idaho _ ,

316 P.3d 640 (2013), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed from an
order revoking probation, wherein the appellant argued that his sentence was
excessively harsh.

In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the

defendant had not demonstrated a colorable need for the requested transcripts, and so,
there was no violation of the defendant's rights by denying him copies of the transcripts
at issue in that case. Brunet, 316 P.3d at 643. However, the Court did not change any
of the pre-existing standards governing what transcripts are necessary for appellate
review. See generally id. In fact, it reaffirmed the standard discussed in Pierce - that
where the length of the sentence is at issue, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the entire record available to the district court. Id. At best, the

Brunet Opinion provides no guidance for determining whether requested transcripts are
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necessary to address merits of sentencing related issues. At worst, Brunet contravenes
United States Supreme Court authority and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court characterized Brunet's request for
transcripts of prior proceedings as a mere "fishing expedition" at taxpayer expense
because Brunet could not identify a specific need for the transcripts prior to the creation
of the transcripts. Id. The fact that Brunet could not establish, prior to production of the
requested transcripts, the contents of those transcripts, or exactly how those contents
would have impacted the claim(s) raised in that appeal, does not mean that Mr. Whitley,
who is situated substantially similarly to Brunet, cannot establish a colorable need for
the transcripts.

As Justice Goldberg has explained, it is appellate counsel's job to

search the record for viable appellate issues:
As any effective appellate advocate will attest, the most basic and
fundamental tool of his profession is the complete trial transcript, through
which his trained fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam in
search of an error, a lead to an error, or even a basis upon which to urge a
change in an established and hitherto accepted principle of law. Anything
short of a complete transcript is incompatible with effective appellate
advocacy.
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnote

and citation omitted). 1 Clearly then, appellate counsel cannot know the evidence and
the claims to be raised on appeal before reviewing the record in a given case. And this

1

In Hardy, the Supreme Court evaluated a federal statute and, therefore, did not "reach
a consideration of constitutional requirements." Hardy, 375 U.S. at 282. Nevertheless,
it is notable that in that case, the Supreme Court made it clear that especially in
instances where the indigent defendant is provided new counsel for purposes of appeal,
his counsel cannot do his job without a full transcript. See id. Further, Justice
Goldberg, who was joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and Stewart,
wrote separately to argue that the Court should have gone further: "[l]n the interests of
justice this Court should require, under our supervisory power, that full transcripts be
provided, without limitation, in all federal criminal cases to defendants who cannot afford
to purchase them, whenever they seek to prosecute an appeal." Id. (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).

12

is especially true where Mr. Whitley is acting through appellate attorneys who did not
represent him below. See id. ("The opinion of the Court agrees with this conclusion as it
relates to 'one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case after the trial is ended.'

I

believe that it is equally applicable to one whose appointed lawyer on appeal was also
his lawyer at trial.") Since, the Idaho Legislature chose to create the State Appellate
Public Defender to represent indigent defendants on appeal only and, therefore, the
vast majority of felony appeals are handled by attorneys with no first-hand knowledge of
the proceedings below, see I.C. § 19-870, it would be particularly unreasonable to
require the defendant to show what the specific evidence in the record is, and how that
specific evidence will impact the claims to be raised on appeal, before he is entitled to
an adequate appellate record.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which attempted to address the scope of review of an
appeal filed from an order revoking probation and clarify the circumstances under which
transcripts of prior proceedings will be necessary for it to address the merits of Morgan's
appellate claims.

In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on

probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
13

questions of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination.
Specifically, it held:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted).

This case has provided no more guidance

than Brunet because it also holds that all the information known to the district court is
relevant, but it fails to provide any explanation of the circumstances under which
transcripts of the prior proceedings will be necessary to address sentencing issues on
appeal.
Additionally, the instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed
the order revoking probation, and here Mr. Whitley is challenging the length of his
sentence, which entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and

14

the revocation of probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the
transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district court

the time of the

probation revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts
are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing
from which the appeal was filed. Rather, the district court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant
portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
2

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Whitley recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals has
recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793
(Ct. App. 2013). However, Mr. Whitley disagrees with the holding in that case as far as
it is inconsistent with the plain language contained in I.AR. 30.
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that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that
[the judge] has observed in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs
therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491

(Ct. App. 1984) (approving

sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a
previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard
what he already knew about Gibson from the other case").

Thus, whether the prior

hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
sentencing decision after revoking probation.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals'
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of
Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.

Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56.
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As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered into
execution after the revocation of probation, the applicable standard of review requires
an independent and comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as
well as the events which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings. The
basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly
remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a
decision." Id. It follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should
consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court
must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order
for this scope of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals
presumed

the judge would

automatically consider prejudgment events when

determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation.
consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court precedent.

This is

See Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907.

And, although the Brunet Court could have altered this standard, it did not do so.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable scope of review, the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Whitley access to those transcripts
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be
dismissed without the transcript.

Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81.

Similarly, in Idaho, an

appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, . . . . and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also
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State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872,

873 (Ct. App. 1985).

If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court

minutes which are sufficient to allow a meaningful review of an appellant's claim, then
the transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of Appeals has
"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to
provide ... [a] record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491
(Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Whitley fails to provide the appellate court with transcripts

necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Whitley's
sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual merits.

If it is state action,

combined with Mr. Whitley's indigency, which prevents him from access to the
necessary transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and any such presumption should no
longer apply.
Moreover, and in light of the denial of the transcripts, the foregoing presumption
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Mr. Whitley
was first given the opportunity for probation, the district court must have found that the
circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member of society. To
ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a
negative, one-sided view of Mr. Whitley. Denial of access to the requested transcripts
has prevented Mr. Whitley from addressing those positive factors in support of his
appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Whitley argues that the events
which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate the district
court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
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In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary
for a merits-based review on appeal.

In this case, the requested transcripts are

necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review,

the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale 3 ; to the
contrary, the question on appeal is whether the record itself supports the district court's
ultimate sentencing decision.

D.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Whitley With Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants counsel on
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States

Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

3

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra.
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The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument to be made or undercutting an argument.

Therefore, Mr. Whitley has not

obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function."

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance.
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Standards 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Whitley on
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Whitley is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Whitley his constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of
that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Whitley's Probation
Mr. Whitley asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation.

When a defendant appeals from an order

revoking probation, the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987) .

State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct.App.1989).
Mr. Whitley is not challenging the district district's finding that he violated the
terms of his probation.

Accordingly, he only contests the district court's decision to
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revoke his probation.

"A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be

overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." State v.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a district court's discretionary decision is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason."

State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation
of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is
consistent with the protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App.
2001).
Mr. Whitley recognizes his probation was not perfect.

However, trial counsel

noted that Mr. Whitley has a tendency to be lazy while on probation and, for that reason,
he ends up with probation violations. (Tr., p.23, Ls.18-23.) However, he has a lot of
ability and with the appropriate motivation he could succeed on probation. (Tr., p.24,
Ls.16-19.) For example he did maintain steady employment with the same employer
while on probation. (PSI, pp.11-12.) Mr. Whitley was willing to participate in a specialty
court program like drug court. (Tr., p.22, Ls.17-19, p.27, Ls.3-6.)
Additionally, Mr. Whitley's family support will help him when he is released from
custody. For example, the mother of Mr. Whitley's child and Mr. Whitley's mother both
displayed their support for him by attending the final probation violation disposition
hearing. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-15.)
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Mr. Whitley also accepted responsibility for his actions in this matter including his
most recent probation violations. (Tr., p.26, Ls.22-24.)
In sum, Mr. Whitley's problems on probation largely stem from a lack of
motivation, which could be changed if he was provided with the appropriate supervision
while on probation.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Whitley's Oral Rule 35
Motion For A Sentence Reduction
Mr. Whitley argues that the unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed,
is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested
leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable." Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).
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Mr. Whitley does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Whitley must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." Arazia, 109 Idaho at 189.
As a preliminary note, Mr. Whitley incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section II, supra.
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that Mr. Whitley's sentence is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Whitley was only
eighteen years old when he was originally sentenced. (R., p.35.) Prior to the original
sentencing hearing, Mr. Whitley received a support letter from a high school counselor
indicating that he was capable person with a good personality. (PSI, p.144.) He also
received letters from his friends and family indicating that he has a good character.
(PSI, pp.302-303.) Mr. Whitley expressed his remorse for his actions and recognized
that he could have either attempted to stop the underlying offense or, at a minimum,
walked away before it occurred. (R., p.155.)
Additionally, Mr. Whitley's rider performance is a mitigating factor. Mr. Whitley
performed well on both of his riders and received two probation recommendations from
the Department of Correction. (PSI, pp.126, 137.) While on his first rider, Mr. Whitley
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earned an A in his writing course.

(PSI, p.136.)

Mr. Whitley also earned his GED.

(PSI, p.11.) Mr. Whitley completed over 100 hours of community service. (PSI, p.136.)
The Department of Correction noted that this is important because the average inmate
only does the bare minimum to get a probation recommendation. (PSI, pp.136-137.)
While on his second rider, he also completed 40 hours of community service.
(PSI, p.125.) Mr. Whitley only received "good" comments about his participation in the
workforce readiness program. (PSI, p.124.)
In sum, Mr. Whitley's sentence is excessively harsh when it is viewed in light of
the mitigating factors present in this matter.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Whitley respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments
which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Whitley
requests that this case be remanded with instructions to place him on probation.
Alternatively, Mr. Whitley respectfully request that this court reduce the fixed portion of
his sentence be reduced. Alternatively, Mr. Whitley respectfully requests that this Court
reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.

SHA
. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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